

# Achieving End-to-End Security with the Arm<sup>®</sup> Cortex<sup>®</sup>-M33 Based LPC5500 MCU Family

Donnie Garcia

Systems & Applications Engineer  
NXP IoT Solutions

June 2019 | Session #AMF-SOL-T3641



SECURE CONNECTIONS  
FOR A SMARTER WORLD

# Agenda

---

- LPC5500 Series Overview
- Security Technology
- LPC55S6xx
  - Security Subsystem
  - PUF Based Key Management
  - Arm Trustzone
  - Secure Debug
- Conclusions

# Series Overview LPC5500




# Launched February 2019

## Unique Security Enhancements


A cornerstone to establishing device trustworthiness is NXP's ROM-based secure boot process that utilizes device-unique keys to create an immutable hardware 'root-of-trust'. The keys can now be locally generated on-demand by an SRAM-based Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) that uses natural variations intrinsic to the SRAM bitcells. This permits closed loop transactions between the end-user and the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), thus allowing the elimination of third-party key handling in potentially insecure environments. Optionally, keys can be injected through a traditional fuse-based methodology.

Furthermore, NXP's SEE improves the symmetric and asymmetric cryptography for edge-to-edge, and cloud-to-edge communication by generating device-unique secret keys through innovative usage of the SRAM PUF. The security for public key infrastructure (PKI) or asymmetric encryption is enhanced through the Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE) security standard as defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). SRAM PUF ensures confidentiality of the Unique Device Secret (UDS) as required by DICE. The newly announced solutions support acceleration for asymmetric cryptography (RSA 1024 to 4096-bit lengths, ECC), plus up to 256-bit symmetric encryption and hashing (AES-256 and SHA2-256) with MbedTLS optimized library.

"Maintaining the explosive growth of connected devices requires increased user trust in those devices," said John Ronco, vice president and general manager, Embedded & Automotive Line of Business, Arm. "NXP's commitment to securing connected devices is evident in its new Cortex-M33 based products built on the proven secure foundation of TrustZone technology, while incorporating design principles from Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) and pushing the boundaries of Cortex-M performance efficiency."



# NXP LPC5500 MCU Series – Roadmap




## Common features across families

- FS USB (wo xtal)
  - HS USB with PHY\*
  - 50MHz SPI,
  - Up to 8/10 Serial Interfaces (FlexComm)
  - I3C interface (LPC557x/8x families)
  - Up to 2Msps 16-bit SAR ADC
  - Comparator
  - Temperature Sensor & RTC
  - 1.8 to 3.6V
  - -40 to 105 °C
- \*not available in all packages

10Ku S/R is budgetary range; will vary for specific package/memory variants



# LPC55S6x Product Overview



## Core Platform

- Up to 100MHz Cortex-M33
  - TrustZone, MPU, FPU, SIMD
- Up to 100MHz Cortex-M33
- Coprocessors
  - DSP Accelerator
  - Crypto Engine
- Multilayer Bus Matrix

## Memory

- Up to 640KB FLASH (includes PFR)
- Up to 320KB RAM
- 128KB ROM

## Timers

- 5 x 32b Timers
- SCTimer/PWM
- Multi-Rate Timer
- OS Timer
- Windowed Watchdog Timer
- RTC
- Micro Timer

## Interfaces

- USB High-speed (H/D) w/ on-chip HS PHY
- USB Full-speed (H/D), Crystal-less
- SDIO, Support 2 cards
- 1 x High-Speed SPI up to 50MHz
- 8 x Flexcomms support up to 8x SPI, 8x I2C, 8x UART, 4x I<sup>2</sup>S channels (total 8 instances)

## Advanced Security Subsystem

- Protected Flash Region (PFR)
- AES-256 HW Encryption/Decryption Engine
- SHA-2
- SRAM PUF for Key Generation support
- PRINCE – On-The-Fly Encrypt/Decrypt for flash data
- Secure debug authentication
- RNG

## Analog

- 16b ADC, 16ch, 1MSPS
- Analog Comparator
- Temperature Sensor

## Packages

- LQFP100
- VFBGA98
- LQFP64 or QFN64

## Other

- Programmable Logic Unit
- Buck DC-DC
- Operating voltage: 1.8 to 3.6V
- Temperature range: -40 to 105 °C

# NXP's LPC5500 Product Spotlight: Bringing Intelligence & Efficiency to the Edge


## Single & Dual-core Cortex-M33 MCU Series

- 755 CoreMarks<sup>1</sup> and 32uA/MHz<sup>2</sup> for leading performance efficiency
- 10x improvement for signal processing & cryptography
- TrustZone + Secure Execution Environment (SEE)
- Rich integration to connect and control
- MCUXpresso Ecosystem with HW & SW scalability



1: 2xCM33 @ 100MHz, 2: 1xCM33 @ 100MHz

# NXP's LPC5500 Leading Performance Efficiency Benchmarks



Coremark  
Frequency  
uA/MHz (Active)

755\*\*  
100MHz†  
32uA/MHz\*

427.25\*\*  
110MHz  
60uA/MHz

84.54\*\*  
32MHz  
25uA/MHz

557.76\*\*  
168MHz  
517uA/MHz

404.8\*\*  
120MHz  
43uA/MHz

\*1xCM33@100MHz

† Dual-core

\*\* Estimated by NXP

\*\* Source: <http://www.eembc.org/coremark/index.php>



# NXP LPC5500 MCU Series: MCUXpresso Software & Tools Ecosystem

Complimentary with Extensive Support



MCUXpresso SDK




MCUXpresso IDE



MCUXpresso Config Tools

Hardware Platform for Ease of Development

- On-board debug circuit
- PCB Layout, Schematic and Board Files Available



LPCXpresso55S69: LPC55S69-EVK

ARM KEIL  
Microcontroller Tools

IAR  
SYSTEMS



Simplify secure embedded development; Reduce time to market.

## LPC5500 MCU Series



# LPC5500 Series Security Resources (as of 4/2019)

[Element14 Secure your Sensor with LPC5500 series](#)

[Embedded World: LPC5500 Security white paper](#)

[LPC55S69 Security Solutions for IoT](#)

[Arm+NXP Webinar on LPC5500](#)

[LPC55Sxx usage of the PUF and Hash Crypt to AES coding](#)

[LPC55S6x Secure GPIO and Usage](#)

[LPC55Sxx Secure Boot](#)

# Hardware Protected Keys Webinar Series

---

This webinar meets [3 times](#).

Tue, Apr 16, 2019 10:00 AM - 11:00 AM CDT

Tue, May 21, 2019 10:00 AM - 11:00 AM CDT

Tue, Jun 18, 2019 10:00 AM - 11:00 AM CDT

## Part 1: Utilizing hardware protected keys on broad market Microcontrollers [Recording](#)

For the IoT Edge device, the cryptographic keys used to perform the services such as encrypted boot, onboarding, and over the air updates are critical components that must be protected. Chip level hardware protected keys are the standard for achieving strong security protection for embedded designs. This session will define what a hardware protected key is and show several examples of how these keys are realized on NXP processors. The i.MX RT 1050 family of devices will be used as a real world example of how Intrinsic ID Broadkey® SRAM based PUF can advance your IoT Security.

## Part 2: Using hardware protected keys on state of the art Microcontrollers

For the latest microcontrollers addressing IoT applications, hardware protected keys address critical security functions to protect application integrity, software confidentiality and encrypt data at rest. This session will explore the ability of the recently launched NXP IoT microcontroller, LPC5500 series. This family of devices will work as the main processing unit for a broad range of IoT applications and integrates breakthrough capabilities with regards to security. Along with Arm TrustZone technology the SRAM PUF based key management makes security easy to use and easy to deploy.

## Part 3: Advanced IoT application key management based on hardware protected keys

The recently launched NXP IoT microcontroller, LPC5500 series, works as the main processing unit for a broad range of IoT applications. Along with Arm TrustZone® technology the chip supports SRAM PUF based key management. The product includes a software development kit (MCUXpresso SDK) that contains prebuilt applications to demonstrate edge to cloud connections out of the box. With the integrated security technology and software enablement, the LPC5500 makes security easy to use and easy to deploy. Join this session for a quick run through the demo applications available to kickstart your next IoT designs.[Less](#)

# Security Technology



# Security Model

## Policies

The **rules** in place that **identify** the **data** that should be **protected**

### For example

The management of firmware, secret keys, user and application data  
Passwords, personal information, network credentials

## Threat landscape

The **definition** of the attacks and attackers that the end device **will face** and **protect** against. Considers the access to the device, and cost of the attack

### For example

Expert attackers who will use off the shelf tools to gain access and insert malware


## Methods

The means by which the policies for the device are enforced. Involves the application of security technology to achieve product goals


### For example

Disabling debug access to restrict the availability of secret data on a processor

# NXP Security Technology




# NXP Solutions for Edge Computing



# NXP for Secure Deployment from Edge to Cloud

May Functionally Overlap






# Protected Over the Lifecycle\* of the Cryptographic Keys


## Key Lifecycle

- **Generation**
  - Who/what creates the key material
- **Establishment**
  - How the key material is shared or signed between entities
- **Storage**
  - Where the key material is placed for future access
- **Use**
  - How the key is utilized during the cryptographic processing
- **Decommission**
  - Revocation and destruction of key material




\*Key Lifecycle <https://community.nxp.com/docs/DOC-333095>

# Protected From Attacks



# LPC55S6x Product Overview



## Core Platform

- Up to 100MHz Cortex-M33
  - TrustZone, MPU, FPU, SIMD
- Up to 100MHz Cortex-M33
- Coprocessors
  - DSP Accelerator
  - Crypto Engine
- Multilayer Bus Matrix

## Memory

- Up to 640KB FLASH (includes PFR)
- Up to 320KB RAM
- 128KB ROM

## Timers

- 5 x 32b Timers
- SCTimer/PWM
- Multi-Rate Timer
- OS Timer
- Windowed Watchdog Timer
- RTC
- Micro Timer

## Interfaces

- USB High-speed (H/D) w/ on-chip HS PHY
- USB Full-speed (H/D), Crystal-less
- SDIO, Support 2 cards
- 1 x High-Speed SPI up to 50MHz
- 8 x Flexcomms support up to 8x SPI, 8x I2C, 8x UART, 4x I<sup>2</sup>S channels (total 8 instances)

## Advanced Security Subsystem

- Protected Flash Region (PFR)
- AES-256 HW Encryption/Decryption Engine
- SHA-2
- SRAM PUF for Key Generation support
- PRINCE – On-The-Fly Encrypt/Decrypt for flash data
- Secure debug authentication
- RNG

## Analog

- 16b ADC, 16ch, 1MSPS
- Analog Comparator
- Temperature Sensor

## Packages

- LQFP100
- VFBGA98
- LQFP64 or QFN64

## Other


- Programmable Logic Unit
- Buck DC-DC
- Operating voltage: 1.8 to 3.6V
- Temperature range: -40 to 105 °C

# Advanced Security LPC5500



# NXP LPC5500 MCU Series: Security Subsystem Overview

- **ROM Supporting**
  - Secure Boot, Debug Authentication & DICE Engine
- **TrustZone for Cortex-M33**
  - Arm's Security Attribution Unit (SAU)
  - Arm's Memory Protection Unit (MPU): Secure & Non-Secure
  - NXP's (implementation) Defined Attribution Unit (using IDAU interface)
  - NXP's Secure Bus, Secure GPIO & Secure DMA Controllers
- **Cryptography Accelerators**
  - Symmetric (AES-256) & Hashing (SHA2) engine
  - On-the-fly flash encryption/decryption engine (PRINCE)
  - Asymmetric engine for RSA and ECC (CASPER)
  - Random Number Generator (RNG)
- **Secure Storage**
  - Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
    - Device unique root key (256 bit strength), 64-4096 bit key size
  - Protected Flash Region
    - RFC4122 compliant 128-bit UUID per device
    - Customer Manufacturing Programable Area (Boot Configuration, RoT key table hash, Debug configuration, Prince configuration)
      - PUF Key Store (Activation code, Prince region key codes, FW update key encryption key, Unique Device Secret)
    - Customer Field Programable Area (Monotonic counter, Prince IV codes)




# Security Technology: PUF



# HW Protected Keys: Hardware PUF

Recently launched LPC5500 family also makes use of PUF technology on the microcontroller in addition to other security capabilities



## Unique Security Enhancements

A cornerstone to establishing device trustworthiness is NXP's ROM-based secure boot process that utilizes device-unique keys to create an immutable hardware 'root-of-trust'. The keys can now be locally generated on-demand by an SRAM-based Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) that uses natural variations intrinsic to the SRAM bitcells. This permits closed loop transactions between the end-user and the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), thus allowing the elimination of third-party key handling in potentially insecure environments. Optionally, keys can be injected through a traditional fuse-based methodology.

Furthermore, NXP's SEE improves the symmetric and asymmetric cryptography for edge-to-edge, and cloud-to-edge communication by generating device-unique secret keys through innovative usage of the SRAM PUF. The security for public key infrastructure (PKI) or asymmetric encryption is enhanced through the Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE) security standard as defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). SRAM PUF ensures confidentiality of the Unique Device Secret (UDS) as required by DICE. The newly announced solutions support acceleration for asymmetric cryptography (RSA 1024 to 4096-bit lengths, ECC), plus up to 256-bit symmetric encryption and hashing (AES-256 and SHA2-256) with MbedTLS optimized library.

"Maintaining the explosive growth of connected devices requires increased user trust in those devices," said John Ronco, vice president and general manager, Embedded & Automotive Line of Business, Arm. "NXP's commitment to securing connected devices is evident in its new Cortex-M33 based products built on the proven secure foundation of TrustZone technology, while incorporating design principles from Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) and pushing the boundaries of Cortex-M performance efficiency."

# SRAM PUF Overview

Leverages the intrinsic entropy of the silicon manufacturing process


Device unique, unclonable fingerprint derived on every activation of the PUF

PUF master key is used to protect other secrets




## Process Variation

Naturally occurring **variations** in the attributes of transistors when chips are fabricated (length, width, thickness)



## Silicon Fingerprint

The start-up values create a **random** and repeatable pattern that is unique to each chip



## SRAM Start-up Values


Each time an **SRAM block** powers on the cells come up as either a 1 or a 0




The silicon fingerprint is turned into a **secret key** that builds the foundation of a security subsystem



# Using PUF Technology



# SRAM PUF Disruptive Physical Protection



## SRAM PUF Technology


- Key generated by device entropy
- No traces of sensitive data in the embedded system

## Other Solutions

- Key programmed externally
- Permanent physical alteration
- Key visible in structure


# PUF Based Key Management on LPC5500 Series

## Protected Flash Area



CFPA Customer Field Programmable Area  
 CMPA Customer Manufacturing floor Programmable Area

# PUF Based Key Management on LPC5500 Series



CFPA Customer Field Programmable Area  
 CMPA Customer Manufacturing floor Programmable Area


# Command Line or GUI Options for PUF Provisioning

The screenshot displays the 'elftosb-gui' application window. On the left, the 'Device configuration' panel is visible, showing 'LPC55xx' as the target device. Under 'Key Store Security', the 'SRAM PUF Enroll' section is active, with 'Enroll' checked. Below this, several key options are listed: 'SBKEK' (checked), 'PRINCE region 0 key', 'PRINCE region 1 key', 'PRINCE region 2 key', and 'UDS'. The 'Export' section at the bottom is also visible, with 'To nonvolatile device memory (internal/QSPI flash)' checked and 'Memory ID' set to 0. On the right, the 'Process output' window shows a series of terminal commands and their outputs. Three specific command lines are highlighted with red boxes: 1. `blhostwinblhost.exe -V -p COM32,57600 -- key-provisioning enroll` 2. `blhostwinblhost.exe -V -p COM32,57600 -- key-provisioning set_user_key 3 ".\temptempSbkek.bin"` 3. `blhostwinblhost.exe -V -p COM32,57600 -- key-provisioning write_key_nonvolatile 0` A vertical stack of green boxes on the right side of the terminal output lists the following provisioning steps: 'PUF Activation code', 'Secure boot KEK Code', 'User KEK code', 'UDS Key Code', 'PRINCE0 KEY Code', 'PRINCE1 KEY Code', and 'PRINCE2 KEY Code'. Red arrows point from the 'Enroll' checkbox in the GUI to the first command, and from the 'SBKEK' checkbox to the second command. Another red arrow points from the 'Export' section to the third command.

Scalable methods for instantiating device unique keys which are protected by PUF technology

*“Using A1 silicon we are working on enabling support for Untrusted-CM manufacturing. When that happens device unique key store( PUF activation code, Prince keys and device key with NXP certificate) is pre-programmed in PFR. “*

# Secure Boot & Encrypted Execution



# Challenge: Asset Protection

- On-chip non-volatile storage is used for storing important assets
  - Secret keys
  - Proprietary SW from OEM and Silicon Manufacturer
  - Application code
  - Other sensitive information
- Prone to attacks with malicious intent
  - Reading the code for cloning
  - Tampering for
    - Illegally gaining trust
    - Changing execution sequence
    - Changing programming value
  - Stealing keys
- Solution
  - Encrypt the code stored in Flash
    - System performance cannot be compromised




# PRINCE for Encrypted Execution

- Is a cryptographic algorithm developed by NXP + 2 Universities
  - <https://eprint.iacr.org/eprint-bin/getfile.pl?entry=2012/529&version=20140612:115014&file=529.pdf>
- A light-weight symmetric block cryptography algorithm
  - 64b block cipher, with 128b crypto key
  - Same HW block supports encrypt and decrypt
- Real-time
  - Low latency decryption, no additional cycles added to read path (compared to 10-14 cycles in AES)
  - No initialization time
  - Combinatorial logic
- Efficient
  - Low cost (Si area)
  - Power efficient
  - No RAM buffers needed



# LPC55Sxx Encrypted Flash Regions


- Data stored in Flash is encrypted version
- Supports 3 regions in 640KB Flash
  - Each region is be at 256KB Address boundary
  - Allows multiple code images from independent source to co-exist
  - Secret-Key and IV Pair per region
- Register programmable crypto-enable bit per sub-region
  - One register per region
  - Each sub-region has 8kB granularity
  - Settings can be stored in PFR and be applied by ROM
- Cached data in FMC (cache) is obscured further using XOR mask with random number




# LPC55Sxx Secure Boot ROM Features

- Support secure boot
  - Booting of Public Key signed images
- Support booting from encrypted Prince regions
- Support Public Keys & Image Revocation
  - Up to 4 RoT keys
  - Up to 16 Image key certificates
- Support pre-configuration of TrustZone-M Settings

# LPC55Sxx Boot ROM Block Diagram



# Security Technology: Trustzone



# Virtualization/Hardware Firewalls

## Protect from Software & Remote Attacks

### Challenges

- Protect from software attacks
  - Buffer overflow
  - Interrupt/Starvation
  - Malware Injection
- Meet minimum latency requirements of real time systems while crossing boundaries


### LPC55S69 Solution

- Based on Cortex-M33 with ARM's Trustzone technology
- NXP's Light weight device attribution unit to simplify setup process
- Two factor isolation protection built in AHB secure bus control with
  - Peripheral Protection Checkers
  - Memory Protection Checkers
- GPIO Masking/isolation
- Interrupt Masking/isolation
- Master Security Wrapper for other masters
- Secure configuration locking

# Virtualization/Hardware Firewalls

## Secure AHB Bus Matrix

- **Has Security side band signals**
  - HPRIV, HNONSEC
    - Pole and anti-pole version of signals used for tamper detection
- **PPC per AHB slave port**
  - Default security level checking
  - Provision to check both security & privilege levels
- **MPCs for memories and bridge ports**
  - Default security level checking
  - Provision to check both security & privilege levels
- **Each master has separate security wrapper (MSW)**




# Virtualization/Hardware Firewalls

## Memory Attribution

- **NXP's Light weight device attribution unit**
  - Address range 0x0000\_0000 to 0x1FFF\_FFFF is Non-Secure
  - Address range 0x2000\_0000 to 0xFFFF\_FFFF
    - If Address Bit\_28 = 0 Non-Secure
    - If Address Bit\_28 = 1 Secure
  - All peripherals and memories are aliased at two locations
- **LPC55S69 supports 8 SAU regions**

## Lightweight Device Arbitration Unit



# Virtualization/Hardware Firewalls

## ROM Configuration of Trustzone

During boot process Trustzone preset data can be provisioned by the zero stage boot (ROM)

- This ensures that before any software runs on the device, TrustZone settings are pre-loaded
- This extends the TrustZone protections from the very start

### TrustZone preset data

LPC55Sxx ROM provides support for TrustZone data configuration during boot process. The TrustZone preset data includes:

- VTOR, VTOR\_NS, NVIC\_ITNS0, NVIC\_ITNS1 (CPU0) registers
- VTOR (CPU1) register
- Secure MPU
- Non-secure MPU
- SAU
- Secure AHB Controller

If the TrustZone preset is enabled, the ROM, after image validation, configures all TrustZone related registers by data, provided at the end of the image. If any register whole peripheral has lock feature and corresponding bit is set, the register is also locked so any further register modification is not possible until next reset.


This feature increases robustness of the user application since the user application boots into pre-configured TrustZone environment and it doesn't need to contain any TrustZone configuration code.




# Virtualization/Hardware Firewalls

## Secure GPIO

- GPIO Read path is always available on a standard microcontroller
  - Secret data could be accessible from this read path
- With Secure GPIO peripheral, when `SEC_GPIO_MASK` is cleared, the read path from pins is blocked



# Security Technology: Secure Debug



# Secure Debug

## Debug Protection Mechanism

### Challenges


- Only authorized external entity allowed to debug
- Permit access only to allowed assets
- Support Return Material Analysis (RMA) flow without compromising security

### LPC55S69 Solution

- Supports RSA-2048/RSA-4096 signed certificate based challenge response authentication to open debug access
- Provides individual debug access control over partitioned assets
- Provides flexible security policing
  - Enforce UUID check
  - Certificate revocations
  - OEM customizable attribution check (model number, department ID etc)
- Security policy fixed at manufacturing

# Secure Debug

## Debug Authentication Flow



# Secure Debug

## Debug Protection Mechanism

### Debug Credential (DC) Certificate




Fig 190. Debug Credential certificate fields

### PKI for Secure boot and Debug

- Same Root of Trust Private keys are used to create the DC signature
- Options for HW and SW constraints
  - Device Unique ID bound
  - Level of Debug access
  - Mass erase enable

# Secure Debug


## LPC55Sxx Debug Domains – SoC Credential Constraints

### DC HW Credential Constraints

- NIDEN - Non-secure non-invasive debug.
- DBGEN - Non-secure invasive debug
- SPNIDEN - Secure non-invasive debug
- SPIDEN - Secure invasive debug
- TAPEN - TAP (Test Access Point) controller
- uDBGEN - Micro-CM33 invasive debug
- uNIDEN - Micro-CM33 non-invasive debug

### DC SW Credential Constraints

- ISPEN - ISP boot command
- FAEN - Field Return Analysis mode command
- MEEN- Flash mass erase command




- Configuration Control
- Fields in Customer Programmed Protect Flash Region provide control of the sub-domains
  - Disabled permanently
  - Enabled after debug authentication
  - Enabled permanently
- Other controls
  - Enforce UUID checking
  - Revoke debug keys

# Secure Debug

## Debug Authentication for RMA Use Case

- 1 OEM generates RoT key pairs and programs the device before shipping.
  - SHA256 hash of RoT public key hashes
- 2 Field Technician generates his own key pair and provides public key to OEM for authorization.
- 3 OEM attests the Field Technician's public key. In the debug credential certificate he assigns the access rights.
- 4 End customer having issues with a locked product takes it to Field technician.
- 5 Field technician uses his credentials to authenticate with device and un-locks the product for debugging.



# Conclusion





# Summary

- **LPC55S69 provides rich peripheral interfaces and security features needed for today's IoT applications.**
  - PUF based key protection
  - ROM enabled key management
- **Arm Trustzone for cortex-M enhances protection from scalable remote attacks**
  - Enforced for the CPU and the SoC microarchitecture (i.e. Secure GPIO)
- **Secure Debug capabilities address the usability of security enabled systems**
  - Enabled by ROM
  - Using the same PKI as Secure Boot



**SECURE CONNECTIONS  
FOR A SMARTER WORLD**